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TIMOTHY L. COGGINS AND SARAH G. HOLTERHOFF1 
Instead of relying on the voodoo information taken from the Internet, Plaintiff must 
hunt for hard copy back-up documentation in admissible form .... 2 
The quotation above from St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., a 1999 US federal 
district court case, captures a perception of the trustworthiness of digital information 
that over ten years later is, in many instances, still uncomfortably close to reality. It raises 
two important questions with which governments providing online information and 
users of that information must grapple: Is digital government information reliable and 
trustworthy? Has the government entity providing digital information online taken the 
care necessary to ensure its authenticity? 
This chapter presents a historical perspective of authenticity of government 
information, provides definitions of significantterms and phrases related to authentication, 
offers basic descriptions of some methods used to ensure authenticity of government 
information, and identifies some examples of what is happening at the federal and state 
level in the United States and in other countries to address these important questions. 
It also suggests some strategies and appropriate steps toward the goal of an affirmative 
answer to the two questions under consideration. The authors are both law librarians, 
and the examples used in this chapter are government-issued legal information. However, 
the principles, processes, and concepts identified in this chapter should be applied to all 
types of digital government information.3 
The authors thank Matthew R. Farley (J.D., 2010, University of Richmond School of Law), Reference Intern at the 
University of Richmond School of Law Library, for his valuable research assistance. 
2 St. Clair v. fohnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. Zd 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
3 Authentication of government-issued information is a complex issue that is difficult to address thoroughly in this 
chapter; therefore, a list of suggested readings and resources appears at the end of the chapter for those who would like 
to learn more about authentication. 
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Authenticity and the Transition 
Throughout the history of the written word, an important issue with recorded 
information has been its integrity, both the accuracy and the completeness of the content. 
Painstaking copying of manuscripts began in medieval monasteries and continued in 
universities, with care taken to maintain uniformity and to avoid corruption of the text. 
Royal monarchs confirmed the authenticity of their official edicts, orders, decrees, and 
declarations by stamping them with a special seal. The advent of the printing press made 
the accurate reproduction of information content much easier to achieve. When early 
printers needed to provide a warranty of reliability for their work and to protect it from 
fraud, they added unique printers' marks to their publications. In the developing print 
culture, a fundamental factor ensuring the integrity of documents was the fixed nature 
of the print medium. 
With the transition to the age of digital information, 4 particularly information made 
available on websites, the integrity of recorded information surfaces once again as an 
issue. In recent years national and state governments have turned increasingly to digital 
format for their official publications. Government information can be created, updated, 
and distributed in digital format with greater speed and efficiency than is possible with 
print format. Users of government information have enjoyed expanded access and 
greater ease of use with digital formats. However, the change to a digital environment 
highlights a new set of information management issues. Concern has been growing in 
some quarters about the substitution of digital sources for print ones without proper care 
being taken to ensure the integrity of the digital versions and to preserve the content. 
Guarantees of authenticity such as seals, printers' marks, and the fixed nature of the 
print medium do not transfer to the digital age. With an explosion in the quantity and 
accessibility of information, the need to confirm its integrity, for legal and research 
purposes in particular, looms as a major issue. 
Many have raised concerns about digital government publications being vulnerable 
to alteration or corruption of the content accidentally or maliciously, as well as the effect 
that alterations and corruption may have on national security. The flexibility that the 
digital format provides is also a fundamental reason for concern. The fluid character 
and elastic, changeable nature of digital media require technological solutions to protect 
and preserve the integrity of the information and new types of seals or marks to signify 
authenticity to users of the information. In the prefatory note to a uniform law that 
the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is drafting 
about authentication, the Drafting Committee highlights this issue: 
Electronic legal information moves from its originating computer through a series of 
other computers or servers until it eventually reaches the individual consumer. The 
information is susceptible to being altered, whether accidentally or maliciously, at each 
transfer. Any such alterations are virtually undetectable. A major issue raised by the 
4 When referring to information in computerized or online format, the most technically accurate and precise term is 
"digital." However, the term "electronic" also is commonly used to indicate the same format. This chapter will generally 
use the former of the terms; some of the cited sources employ the latter in the same context. 
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change to an electronic environment, therefore, is whether the information consulted 
by consumers is trustworthy, or authentic.5 
More about the draft uniform law will appear later in this chapter. 
With the move from paper to digital formats, it is necessary for governments to adopt 
technology and best practices and to adhere to standards to ensure a level of trust in 
the authenticity of their digital documents, similar to that enjoyed by the print format, 
and to preserve the integrity of the information. While digital provision of government 
information has many benefits, the authenticity of content provided in this format must 
be safeguarded and its preservation guaranteed. The concept of authentic and reliable 
government information must be redefined for the digital age. 
Why does authentication matter? According to the US Government Printing Office, 
the official disseminator of federal government information in print format for over 150 
years and more recently in digital format as well, "In the 21st century, the increasing 
use of electronic documents poses special challenges in verifying authenticity, because 
digital technology makes such documents easy to alter or copy, leading to multiple, non-
identical versions that can be used in unauthorized or illegitimate ways." 6 
In particular, legal information that is understood to be both official and authentic 
is at risk in the digital age. When using print legal materials, it is usually clear that the 
documents are official and authentic because of the fixed nature of the content once it has 
been printed (and sometimes because of a seal, stamp, or official binding or format). The 
text is easily verifiable, and any changes would be readily detectible. Additionally, print 
legal information typically exists in multiple, identical copies held in various locations, 
with that redundancy providing relative assurance that the authoritative content will be 
preserved. In contrast, authenticity is much less obvious with digital sources. They are 
inherently susceptible to corruption or tampering, and they are not trustworthy unless 
they are able to be authenticated using encryption-based methods. Digital information 
needs to be authenticated and verified to be the accurate, complete, and unaltered 
version, and measures for its long-term preservation must be taken. 
Librarians, particularly law librarians, are increasingly concerned about the lack 
of attention to authentication shown by most governments as they replace print 
publications with digital versions. The American Association of Law Libraries raised the 
authentication and preservation issues over a decade ago, and law librarians in the US 
and other countries have begun efforts to bring the matter to the attention of officials of 
their national and state governments. 
nitions 
For a clear understanding of authentication and related issues, the definitions of certain 
key words and phrases are important. 
Authentication is the process of verifying that a document is authentic and that no 
alterations in the document occurred in its route from the producer of the document to 
5 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform Law Commission), Prefatory Note, 
Authentication and Preservation of State Electronic Legal Materials Act (2010). 
6 Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/authentication/index.html. 
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the recipient. Others describe authentication as validation of a user, computer, or some 
digital object to ensure that it is what it claims to be. 
Authenticity describes the quality of being authentic or of established authority 
for truth and correctness. It typically refers to the quality and credibility of the digital 
document and covers issues such as genuineness, legitimacy, undisputed credibility, 
believability, and trustworthiness. 
Certification is the process that is used to ensure that a digital object is authentically 
the content issued by the author or the issuer. A certificate is a mark of veracity that 
conveys certification information to users and is in some way joined to the object itself. 
Chain of custody (confidence or responsibility) refers to the verifiable record of the 
sequential steps in the handling of a digital document, usually beginning with a certified 
original text. Chain of custody normally utilizes certification and digital signatures. 
Digital signature and electronic signature are slightly different terms. An electronic 
signature is a generic, technology neutral term that refers to the many different ways that 
a person can sign an electronic record. Electronic signatures include signatures such as 
those typed at the end of an email message, a secret code or PIN, or a unique biometrics-
based identifier such as a finger print. A digital signature is an electronic symbol, sound, 
or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a 
person with the intent to sign the record. The digital signature is used to authenticate the 
identity of the sender or of the signer of a document and to ensure the integrity of the 
original content of a document. 
Digital (or electronic) document is data that is recorded or stored on any medium 
(technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or 
similar capabilities) in or by a computer system or other similar device and that can be 
read or perceived by a person or a computer system or other similar device. The words 
11 digital 11 and "electronic" are often used interchangeably. 
Official version is a document either in paper format or disseminated digitally that 
is governmentally mandated or approved by statute or rule by authorities. Digital and 
paper versions of a document may be equal in status. Frequently today, however, the 
paper version may be the only version that is designated as official. In some instances, 
the digital version may be the only official version. In other situations, there may not be 
an official version because a court, for example, might elect to discontinue publishing its 
own reporter for its decisions and rely instead on an unofficial commercial version. 
Permanent public access refers to a government policy and practice that ensures 
applicable government information is preserved for current, continuous, and future 
public access. 
Prima facie evidence of the law denotes evidence in common law jurisdictions that 
would be sufficient to prove a particular proposition or fact unless that evidence is 
rebutted. Official versions of documents are prima facie evidence of the law in most 
jurisdictions. Section 5 of the draft NCCUSL uniform act indicates that "[e]lectronic legal 
material authenticated under Section 4 [of this Act] is presumed to be a true and correct 
copy of the legal material. 11 
Reliability is a broader term that covers concepts such as authoritative character, 
official status, and integrity. 
Definitions of other terms, including public key infrastructure, biometrics, and 
cryptography, appear in the next section of this chapter. 
The purpose of authentica 
integrity, reliability, and tn 
is what it purports to be-
actually taken the necessa 
methods used to ensure al 
nearly unintelligible for th 
authentication that is famff 
that he or she claims to be-
Here are some commo1 
ensure that an individual i: 
PASSWORDS 
Passwords, the most comn 
require a user to remember 
to a desired resource or se 
technology include the fr 
unchanged for long period~ 
of overly simplistic passwo 
are at risk of falling prey t 
play an important role in 
with other technologies fo1 
TOKENS 
Token devices such as magi 
USB keys typically last lon~ 
They provide little protec1 
possession of these object 
Tokens are more effective 
or a password. 
PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRU< 
Public key infrastructure 
certificates, which are ofte1 
authority acts as a third-
integrity of the content. T 
by a Web browser during a 
applications encounter th( 
the issuing certificate or c 
the website owner. Digital 
highly secure, encrypted i 
the sender) and public key 
text. While PKI has seen v 
----------------------------------... •----------
I st Century 
: a user, computer, or some 
r of established authority 
1d credibility of the digital 
cy, undisputed credibility, 
~ital object is authentically 
is a mark of veracity that 
joined to the object itself. 
e verifiable record of the 
, beginning with a certified 
md digital signatures. 
erent terms. An electronic 
~ many different ways that 
include signatures such as 
N, or a unique biometrics-
electronic symbol, sound, 
I executed or adopted by a 
is used to authenticate the 
~nsure the integrity of the 
r stored on any medium 
tical, electromagnetic, or 
ar device and that can be 
similar device. The words 
1 sseminated digitally that 
y authorities. Digital and 
'lltly today, however, the 
'ficial. In some instances, 
lations, there may not be 
liscontinue publishing its 
:ommercial version. 
1d practice that ensures 
continuous, and future 
m law jurisdictions that 
unless that evidence is 
·nee of the law in most 
es that "[e]lectronic legal 
l to be a true and correct 
authoritative character, 
ucture, biometrics, and 
Authenticating Digital Government Information 137 
Authentication m 
The purpose of authentication as it relates to government information-to ensure the 
integrity, reliability, and trustworthiness of a document and to confirm that a document 
is what it purports to be-is widely understood, even if many governments have not 
actually taken the necessary steps to authenticate their documents. The technological 
methods used to ensure authenticity, however, are not as well understood and may be 
nearly unintelligible for those who lack scientific or computer expertise. An example of 
authentication that is familiar to everyone-helping ensure that an individual is the person 
that he or she claims to be-provides a good illustration of authentication generally. 
Here are some commonly used types of user authentication technology that help to 
ensure that an individual is the person that he or she claims to be. 
PASSWORDS 
Passwords, the most common and least expensive form of authentication technology, 
require a user to remember a string of characters and enter this information to gain access 
to a desired resource or service. Problems with passwords as a form of authentication 
technology include the frequent sharing of passwords, the tendency to leave them 
unchanged for long periods, the reuse of a password across multiple accounts, and the use 
of overly simplistic passwords. Owners of passwords with one or more of these problems 
are at risk of falling prey to novice identity thieves or simple hacking tools. Passwords 
play an important role in user authentication, but they should be used in conjunction 
with other technologies for adequate security. 
TOKENS 
Token devices such as magnetic strips (credit cards), smart cards, identification cards, and 
USB keys typically last longer than passwords and are more difficult to hack or reproduce. 
They provide little protection, however, if lost or stolen. Similar to passwords, simple 
possession of these objects often serves as the only means to distinguish the owner. 
Tokens are more effective if they are combined with something else such as a PIN code 
or a password. 
KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Public key infrastructure (PKI) refers to authentication technology that uses digital 
certificates, which are often issued by an independent certificate authority. The certificate 
authority acts as a third-party reference regarding the identity of the owner or the 
integrity of the content. The certificate can be attached to email messages or references 
by a Web browser during an e-commerce transaction as a means of identification. When 
applications encounter these certificates, the origin can be verified by inquiring back to 
the issuing certificate or certification authority to ensure the identity of the sender or 
the website owner. Digital certificates also provide a means to allow users to exchange 
highly secure, encrypted information using a combination of a private key (owned by 
the sender) and public key (freely shared with recipients) to encrypt and decrypt message 
text. While PKI has seen very limited use in the marketplace as an application to affirm 
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that an individual is, in fact, the person that he or she claims to be, it is viewed as 
essential for the authentication of digital government information. 
BIOMETRICS 
Biometric devices examine unique physical characteristics to differentiate one person 
from another. Biometric verification, using fingerprints, irises, voice patterns, or facial 
patterns, is considered to be highly secure because these physical characteristics are 
unique to each individual and cannot be easily duplicated. The reliability of biometrics 
can be strengthened further by combining several types of recognition, known as 
multiple biometrics, and/or requiring users to enter a PIN code in order to provide a 
unique self-identification. 
Applying Authentication Technology to Digital Government 
Information 
To authenticate digital government information, governments are using some of the 
same types of technology used in user authentication, as well as other technology such 
as digital certificates and certification, cryptography, digital signatures, and seals of 
authenticity. The primary purpose of these technologies is to ensure the integrity of the 
content and to give reasonable assurance to users of the information that a document is 
what it purports to be (reliability) and that it can be used and cited by a person for what 
it claims to be (trustworthiness). Following are brief descriptions of these commonly used 
types of technology. 
PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Public key infrastructure is a system of hardware, software, policies, and people that 
provides a range of security assurances, including authentication, data integrity, data 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. PKis provide a desired level of trust using public 
key-based cryptographic techniques to generate and manage electronic certificates. 
Certificates link one individual or entity to a public key. The public key validates the 
information provided by the individual or entity or facilitates data encryption. Certificates 
verify digital signatures (providing authentication and data integrity) and facilitate data 
encryption (providing confidentiality). If designed and implemented correctly, a PKI 
can ensure that a given digital signature is properly linked to the individual or entity 
associated with it (providing non-repudiation) and can satisfy the criteria used to evaluate 
systems that produce electronic signatures. 
DIGITAL SIGNATURES 
Digital signatures are a document-dependent way of encrypting information by applying 
asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric encryption uses a key pair, consisting of a private 
and a public key. To sign a document digitally, the first step is creation of a hash value. 
The hash value is the result of a mathematical calculation (using algorithms also called 
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hash value is signed subsequently by the signer's private key and added to the document. 
The addressee can check the origin of the document by applying the signer's public key 
to the digital signature and checking whether the hashes match. The digital signature 
further ensures the integrity of the document, because the hash value changes if the 
document is tampered with or altered. 
Digital signatures provide for the three security assurances mentioned above under 
the PKI discussion: authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. The digital 
signature guarantees that the document is authentic and has not been tampered with 
or altered. The digital signature ensures confidentiality because it represents that the 
information has been protected from unauthorized viewing and use. Finally, the digital 
signature represents that the sender will not repudiate the information by subsequently 
denying that the information emanated from him or her. 
A digital signature by itself cannot provide sufficient evidence of the signatory's 
identity. A digital certificate issued by a trusted third party, sometimes referred to as 
a trusted intermediary or trust service provider, links the signature to the signatory. 
Certification of a signature in this way increases certainty and trust, in the same manner 
that a notary is a physical witness to manuscript signatures. 
DIGITAL CERTIFICATES AND CERTIFICATION 
A digital certificate is an electronic credential that guarantees the association between 
a public key and a specific entity. It is created by adding the entity's name, the entity's 
public key, and other identifying information in an electronic document that is sorted in a 
directory or other database. The digital certificate, created by a trusted third party called a 
certificate or certification authority, provides the assurance that the public key contained 
in the certificate does, indeed, belong to the individual named in the certificate. The 
certification authority digitally signs the certificate, is responsible for managing digital 
certificates, and oversees the generation, distribution, renewal, revocation, and suspension 
of digital certificates. A certification authority may also set restrictions on a certificate, 
such as the starting date for which the certificate is valid as well as its expiration date. 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Cryptography is a form of secret writing that uses codes and ciphers to conceal the 
contents of a document or message. It transforms messages into unintelligible forms 
in order to hide the content, to establish its authenticity, and to prevent undetected 
modification through the use of an algorithm and a key to function. The algorithm is 
comparable to a lock, and the key operates the lock. Any person can lock a door simply 
by clicking the lock to its closed position (the encryption), but only the owner of the lock 
can unlock (the decryption) the lock. 
There are three commonly used classes of cryptographic mechanisms: symmetric 
(secret key) cryptography; secure hash functioning; and asymmetric (public key) 
cryptography. Symmetric (secret key) cryptography is a class of algorithms where both 
the information sender and the information recipient share a secret key. Symmetric 
algorithms are well suited for confidentiality. They can also be used to authenticate the 
integrity and origin of data, since only the sender and the recipient have the ability 
to create the unique coded text. For example, the sender could code a portion of the 
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message, and the recipient could code the same portion of receipt in order to verify the 
accuracy of the algorithm the sender used, and thus verify identity. However, it is difficult 
to establish the initial shared key, and most users resort to a trusted third party to do so. 
Asymmetric (public key) cryptography occurs when one party has a private key and 
the other party has a corresponding public key. The data encrypted with one key can be 
decrypted with the other key. For example, coded messages generated with the private 
key can be accessed by all those with a public key, and information coded with the public 
key can be decrypted by the private key holder. Asymmetric algorithms, well suited for 
authentication and integrity, are used to perform three operations: (1) digital signatures, 
(2) key transport, and (3) key assignment. 
Secure hash functioning takes a stream of data and reduces it to a fixed size through 
a one-way (irreversible) mathematical function. The result is a "digest," which can be 
reproduced and verified by any party with the same stream of data and secure hash. 
Secure hash functioning can ensure integrity, but it can provide authentication only if 
the parties share a secret key. A significant issue associated with hash functioning at this 
time, however, is that the document has to be re-signed since algorithms expire over 
time. 
Tech Cu 
Are some of the above technologies or others methods already being used by governments 
for the purpose of authenticating their government information? This section provides 
illustrations of such uses within the United States. The first example shows how the 
US Government Printing Office is using authentication technology and PDF versions 
of documents to ensure the authenticity of some important government information 
sources, including primary legal materials. The next examples illustrate what some states 
within the United States are doing to ensure the authenticity of primary sources of the 
law, such as administrative regulations and court opinions. 
UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Users of US Government Printing Office (GPO) publications in print format have been 
able to rely upon the authenticity of the content of those documents. In the 1980s, 
GPO began supplementing or replacing print documents with tangible electronic format 
versions (floppy disks and CD-ROMs). With the evolution of the Internet that began in 
the 1990s, increasing use of digital format for the publication of government information 
has made authentication of the contents a major issue. GPO has recognized that digital 
technology makes documents easy to alter or copy, introducing the possibility of multiple 
non-identical versions that could be used in unauthorized or illegitimate ways. 
In order to disseminate, protect, and preserve information from all three branches 
of government, GPO has launched its Federal Digital System or FDsys. 7 This system 
7 See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys. As of December 20, 2010, FDsys became GPO's official system of record for online 
government information. FDsys describes itself now as the location to access "America's Authentic Government 
Information." 
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provides no-fee digital access to official and authenticated versions of federal government 
information submitted by Congress and Federal agencies. FDsys is also intended to 
preserve the information as technology changes. It is replacing and improving an earlier 
system, GPO Access. 
FDsys has three roles: as a system to manage content, as a repository to preserve 
content, and as an advanced search engine. It securely controls digital content throughout 
its lifecycle to ensure content integrity and authenticity. It follows archival system 
standards to ensure long-term preservation and access of digital content. Its search engine 
combines extensive metadata creation with modern search technology. 
GPO uses a digital certificate to apply digital signatures to the official content of 
certain documents in PDF format after the validity of the content has been confirmed, 
providing assurance that the documents have not been altered since GPO disseminated 
them. At this time, the chain of custody that GPO provides begins in most cases when 
GPO receives the content and does not extend back to the content originator. However, 
one example in which an uninterrupted chain of certificates currently does exist is the 
Budget of the US Government (FY 2010 and FY 2011), for which GPO received content 
using a PKI signature. In order for users to validate the certificate that was used by GPO 
to apply a digital signature to the document, a chain of custody or a certification path 
between the certificate and an established point of trust is established. Every certificate 
within that path must be checked. The software required for validating digital signatures 
on PDF documents is Adobe Acrobat or Reader, version 7.0 or higher. The technology 
used to certify these documents allows GPO to secure the data integrity and provides 
users with assurance that the content is unchanged since GPO disseminated it. 
In addition to certifying a document, GPO uses digital signature technology to 
add a visible Seal of Authenticity to authenticated and certified PDF documents. When 
GPO signs and certifies a document, a blue ribbon icon appears to the left of the Seal 
of Authenticity and in the Signatures tab within Adobe Acrobat or Reader. When users 
print a document that has been signed and certified by GPO, the Seal of Authenticity will 
automatically print on the document, but the blue ribbon will not print. The GPO Seal 
of Authenticity is a graphic of an eagle next to the words "Authenticated US Government 
Information." This seal notifies users that a document has been authenticated by GPO. 
By using digital signature technology to add the Seal to a PDF document, GPO attests that 
the document has not been altered since it was authenticated and disseminated by GPO. 
A digital file that has been digitally signed and certified by GPO includes identifying 
information and the statement that "GPO attests that this document has not been altered 
since it was disseminated by GPO." A digital signature, viewed through the GPO Seal 
of Authenticity, verifies document integrity and authenticity of GPO online Federal 
documents, at no charge to users. The visible digital signatures on online PDF documents 
serve the same purpose as handwritten signatures or traditional wax seals on printed 
documents. Documents that have been authenticated by GPO by mid-2010 include such 
primary sources of law as public and private laws from 1995 forward (digitally signed 
and certified, containing GPO's Seal of Authenticity, using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
technology), the current edition of the US Code, the Statutes at Large (2003-2006), and the 
Code of Federal Regulations (select years). Among other digital documents authenticated 
at this time are Congressional bills from 1993 forward (new bills are authenticated as they 
I. 
Ii' 
II: 
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are posted), the Federal Register, Presidential documents, and the Budget of the United 
States for FY 2010 and FY 2011 (digitally signed and certified PDF files). 8 
STATES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
Within the past ten years, state governments in the US have been transitioning rapidly 
from paper to digital publication of their primary legal sources-statutes, court decisions, 
and regulations-without fully considering the implications of those changes. The move 
to digital publication of former print sources saves money and provides easier access 
to these sources for many public users. However, in nearly all cases, states have not 
adopted procedures to authenticate the new digital information or to provide a reliable 
infrastructure to preserve it. While a number of states have digital signature laws that apply 
to online business transactions and administrative matters, this use of digital technology 
has not carried over to such government functions as the publication of primary legal 
sources. Use of authentication technology for e-business and e-government is viewed 
as cost-effective, while employing the same technology to protect other types of state 
government information may be viewed as unnecessarily and prohibitively expensive. 
States are embracing online, digital publication dissemination to save printing costs, and 
the prospect of adding authentication expenses as a budget item is not a welcome one. 
As of mid-2010, most US states are not using technology such as encryption, public 
key infrastructure, or digital signatures to authenticate the digital legal publications 
provided on their government websites. Some states do include disclaimers to point out 
that the digital versions of primary legal sources provided on their websites lack official 
status and/or are not authenticated. For example, posted along with the Minnesota 
statutes that appear on the state government website is the following message: 
Information on this website is not intended to replace the official versions. However, 
every attempt has been made to ensure that the information on this website is accurate 
and timely. The website is presented 'as is' and without warranties, either express or 
implied, including warranties regarding the content of this information.9 
Despite the general lack of state action on the matter of authentication, a few states have 
begun to recognize and address the issue for one or more of the digital legal resources 
posted on their websites. 
DELAWARE 
Delaware is authenticating and certifying its online administrative documents and 
some legislative documents (session laws). Delaware authenticates its online Delaware 
Administrative Code by using digital signatures on PDF documents. While there is no 
8 As part of its strong and continuing focus on the topic, the US Government Printing Office convened a "Document 
Authentication Workshop" on June 18, 2010 to seek input from federal agencies and the user community about 
authentication. The workshop covered issues such as authentication for automated, high volume applications, standards 
and methods for bulk data authentication, chain of custody, re-authentication over time, and granular authentication. At 
the workshop GPO representatives mentioned that GPO is already making available bulk XML data for the Federal Register 
and the Code of Federation Regulations, but this data is unsigned at this time and therefore not authentic or official. 
9 See https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?view=info. 
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officially published compilation of the entire Delaware administrative code, the state makes 
certain titles available on the state's website10 and has begun certifying the authenticity of 
those titles. The official version of the state session laws is Laws of the State of Delaware 
(commonly called Laws of Delaware or Delaware Laws), published by the State of Delaware. 
Session laws from 1999 to the present are available on the state's website11 and are certified 
as authentic. Online Delaware court documents have not been certified or authenticated. 
OHIO 
Ohio has begun to address the authentication of online legal resources, but only for one 
source-Supreme Court of Ohio opinions. The opinions posted on the Court's website 
are authenticated through the use of digital signatures. Ohio uses encryption-based 
authentication procedures for all decisions, which are available as PDF files and are 
searchable in the database on the Ohio Supreme Court website. 12 Each opinion opened in 
Adobe Reader has a tab, either labeled "signatures" or identified by an icon representing a 
pen and paper, which is incorporated into the document's frame. Under that tab, notations 
indicate that the document is "signed by the Supreme Court." The opinions are unofficial. 
Official versions of opinions are located in the print versions of Ohio Official Reports. 
UTAH 
In 2007 the Utah Division of Administrative Rules announced the addition of file 
authentication to its website. Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MDS) authentication has been 
added to publication files. An MDS hash is, in essence, a signature for a file. A user can 
confirm the integrity of a specific file the user downloads by comparing the MDS hash 
provided by the Division with one that the user generates. Various software packages are 
available, many at no cost, that permit individuals to generate an MDS hash. If the hashes do 
not match exactly, then the integrity of the file is in question. The Division provides an MDS 
hash for the Utah State Bulletin, Utah State Digest, Utah Administrative Code and update 
files, and Utah Administrative Rules Index of Changes in PDF, RTF, TXT and ZIP formats. 13 
ARKANSAS 
The state of Arkansas decided in 2009 to discontinue print publication of the Arkansas 
Reports and Arkansas Appellate Reports and to designate the appellate decisions posted 
on the state judiciary website as the official versions. Since then Arkansas officials have 
explored ways to authenticate those digital opinions. They looked for a process that would 
authenticate two versions of the court opinions-the "official original" (produced in 
WordPerfect format) and the "official copy" (PDF used for dissemination). They wanted to 
be able to warrant the chain of custody between the two versions and to ensure that the 
files are protected from alteration or tampering. They sought and received input and advice 
from Singlepoint (a United Kingdom-based company specializing in information integrity). 
10 See http://regulations.delaware.gov/ AdminCode/. 
11 See http://delcode.delaware.gov/sessionlaws/. 
12 See www.sconet.state.oh.us/. 
13 All are available from http://www.rules.utah.gov/. 
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Arkansas ultimately selected a technology to verify authenticity and detect tampering 
by applying a unique digital fingerprint and time stamp to content files. When the 
"official original" document (WordPerfect file) is entered into the Arkansas document 
management system, it will be sealed automatically. The document will then undergo 
a number of changes before being released as the "official copy" (PDF file). The file will 
be automatically sealed at key stages in the process: renaming of the file, creation of 
metadata, and addition of final amendments. On the state judiciary website, a user will 
be able either to download the "official copy" PDF file for validation at a later date (using 
an applet or small java application) or to validate the file as it is being downloaded. 
Validation will indicate by whom the file was sealed and when the sealing occurred, 
ensuring that the contents of the sealed file are authentic and have not changed. If the 
sealed file has been tampered with in any way, the validation will fail. Arkansas began a 
beta test of this new technology in June 2010. PDF files with an authenticating seal were 
available for a short period. However, in late 2010, the PDF files no longer have seals of 
authentication attached to them, and there is no indication at the website when the 
court plans to begin using the authentication technology again. 
Cu 
Other countries are dealing with authentication of government-issued information as 
well. Some countries are authenticating digital information already, while others are 
working collaboratively within a union of member states to create the structure for general 
acceptance of authentication technology, such as electronic signatures. The following 
examples highlight the current use of authentication technology by two countries in 
particular and the efforts of several international organizations. 
AUSTRALIA-AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY LEGISLATION 
The online version of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) legislation now reflects 
fundamental changes to reassure users about the authenticity of the legislation. The ACT 
Legislation Register website14 includes the acts and ordinances as made and republished, as 
well as other legislative instruments such as subordinate laws, disallowable instruments, 
approved forms, notifiable instruments and commencement notices. 
Users access authorized printed legislation on the website by downloading authorized 
files from the ACT Legislation Register website and printing them. The website indicates 
that 11 a document printed from an authorized file is legally presumed to be an accurate copy 
of the piece of legislation." The ACT Parliamentary Counsel's Office (PCO) implemented 
authentication technology to provide the security necessary to make certain that the 
downloaded files are true copies of ACT legislation. One important measure has been to 
provide a secure website for the legislation register using a Verisign SSL certificate. Users 
can verify that the website is legitimate by checking the certificate, and clicking on the 
Verisign icon in the bottom right corner of the legislation register homepage. 
14 See http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/. 
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The Parliamentary Counsel's Office also digitally signs authorized documents, using 
digital signatures to encrypt electronic documents by applying a mathematical code, or 
private key, held securely by the PCO. A certificate (public key) confirms that the document 
was created by the PCO and that the document has not been changed since the document 
was last digitally signed. The public key can be downloaded from a digital signatures page 
on the website. Users need only to download the public key once because it will then 
apply to all digitally signed files on the legislation register. To use digital signatures, the 
user needs Adobe Acrobat 5.0 or Acrobat Reader 5.1 or a higher version of the reader. 
The PCO indicates that digital signatures will be applied also to authorized copies of 
legislative materials, such as explanatory statements and bills presented to the Legislative 
Assembly. These documents have the same legal status as authorized legislation. 
FRANCE-LE JOURNAL OFFICIEL 
Le Journal officiel de la Republique francaise contains laws, decrees, orders, circulars, and 
nominal measures, listed according to the ministries responsible. It also includes collective 
agreements, parliamentary information, opinions and communications, judicial and legal 
announcements, concessions or requests for name changes, as well as other government-
issued information. All text published in the paper edition also can be consulted digitally 
with a few exceptions. Acts related to the status and nationality of persons are published 
exclusively in paper, most likely to protect the privacy of the individual. Regulatory 
acts related to administration organization, public agents, the state budget, and other 
independent public authorities are published exclusively on the Internet. 
The legal basis for publishing information in France is the Constitution. Ordinance 2004-
164 of February 20, 2004 on the publication and enactment oflaws and certain administrative 
acts established that the digital Le Journal officiel (in its authentic version) has the same legal 
status as the paper edition. Le Journal officiel is available via the website Legifrance,15 whose 
mission is access to the law for the public. Legifrance provides access to French law, including 
texts published in the official gazette, collective agreements, and the jurisprudence of courts 
and tribunals. It also provides access to standards issued by the European institutions and 
treaties and international agreements binding on France. Legifrance offers three search 
modes for French law: theme (from the home page), simple, and expert. 
The electronic Le Journal officiel, besides sharing official status with the paper edition, 
is also equally authentic, due to the use of two types of electronic signatures. In most 
cases XAdES with a high level of authentication (XML advanced electronic signature), 
as a non-intrusive signature, is used, and PDF (IETF 2315/5652, aka PKCS#7) is used 
as an intrusive signature. An AdES is an electronic signature that meets the following 
requirements: uniquely linked to the signatory; capable of identifying the signatory; 
created in a way that the signatory can maintain sole control; and linked to the data to 
which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable. 
PKCS#7 refers to the public key cryptography standard that is probably the most widely 
used to describe a general syntax for data that has cryptography applied to it, such as 
digital signatures and digital envelopes. A secure server with certificate and a time stamp 
is used with the software nCipher Appliance. A crypto box is used to secure the private 
keys for the publication signature. 
15 See http://www,legifrance.gouv.fr/. 
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LEGAL GAZETIES GENERALLY 
A legal gazette is typically the publication of a government that reports actions taken by 
its various branches, such as new legislation and regulations. The website of the European 
Forum of Official Gazettes provides detailed information about the official gazettes of 
various countries, including whether or not the country has taken steps to ensure the 
authenticity of the information provided in the digital version of the gazettes. 16 The 
European Forum of Official Gazettes was created in 2004 by the organizations responsible 
for publishing the official gazettes of the European Union member states and the Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities. The objective of the Forum is to 
exchange ideas and information on publication processes, technology and best practices 
between the official publishers. For each country, the website provides the details of the 
legal gazette for that country such as what is included and whether or not the paper 
and digital editions are both legally binding. For example, in this section of the report 
about Estonia's legal gazette, it states: "Since June 2002 the paper and the electronic 
editions have been equally authentic. The Thawte web server certificate based on the 
HTTPS protocol is used to guarantee the workflow and authentication procedures of 
the electronically published text." 17 Other information provided in the entry for each 
member state's gazette includes the details of the publishing institution, the drafting 
and publishing procedures, the collections of consolidated legislation, and the legislative 
portals and online databases. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Although primarily directed to the "internal market" and with the needs of businesses 
and commerce as a primary purpose, Directive 1999/93 of the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union, dated December 13, 1999, established a European 
framework for digital signatures and encryption. The purpose of the Directive, as 
outlined in Article l of the Directive, is to "facilitate the use of electronic signatures and 
to contribute to their legal recognition. It [the Directive] establishes a legal framework 
for electronic signatures and certain certification-services in order to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal marker." Article 2 includes definitions of electronic signature, 
advanced electronic signature, certificate, certification service provider, signatory and 
other terms used in the Directive. Article 2, section 2, defines an /1 advanced electronic 
signature" as an electronic signature that meets the following requirements: (a) uniquely 
linked to the signatory; (b) capable of identifying the signatory; (c) created using means 
that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; and (d) linked to the data to 
which it relates in such a manner than any subsequent change of the date is detectable. 
Article 5 outlines the effect of electronic signatures in member states. This Article 
indicates that member states should ensure that advanced electronic signatures that are 
based on a qualified certificate and that are created by a secure signature creation device 
satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in electronic form, just 
as a handwritten signature satisfies these requirements in relation to paper-based data. 
16 See http://circa.europa.eu/irc/ opoce/ojf/info/ data/prod/html/index.htm. 
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Moreover, Article 5 states that advanced electronic signatures should be admissible as 
evidence in legal proceedings. 
Although this Directive does not focus on the authentication of government-issued 
information, it does establish a framework for the use of electronic signatures throughout 
the member states, an important part of any authentication system. 
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW-ACCESSING THE 
CONTENT OF FOREIGN LAW 
On October 19-21, 2008, the Hague Conference on Private International Law convened 
a meeting of experts to discuss global co-operation for disseminating digital legal 
information. Experts attending the session represented stakeholders and providers from 
the library and information communities, educational institutions, legal information 
institutes ("free access to law" movement), legal community, and others, including 
individuals from the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law. One of the purposes of the conference was to assist with the preparation of a 
feasibility study on the "development of a new instrument for cross-border co-operation 
concerning the treatment of foreign law." 
The attending experts developed guiding principles as part of the feasibility study on 
this access to foreign law project. Several of these guiding principles deal with integrity and 
authoritativeness of legal information, and one guiding principle deals with preservation. 
These relevant guiding principles are: 
" State parties are encouraged to make available authoritative versions of their legal 
materials provided in electronic form. 
" State parties are encouraged to take all reasonable measures available to them to 
ensure that authoritative legal materials can be reproduced or re-used by other bodies 
with clear indications of their origins and integrity (authoritativeness). 
" State parties are encouraged to remove obstacles to the admissibility of these materials 
in their courts. 
.. State parties are encouraged to ensure long-term preservation and accessibility of 
their legal materials referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. 18 
The Hague Conference report cites the State-by-State Report on Authentication of Online 
Legal Resources published by the American Association of Law Libraries. 
Many individual countries, including Australia, Austria, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
and Spain, have passed digital signature laws. Most are similar in terms of the content. 
For example, Finland's digital signature law, the Act on Electronic Service in the 
Administration, defines the scope and structure of the elements of a PKI for digital 
signature and identifies specific exclusions, including the use of digital certificates for 
the application to administrative judicial procedures. Other countries, such as Brazil, use 
digital signatures to vouch for the authenticity of legal materials online. The Supreme 
18 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Accessing the Content of Foreign Law: No l lB-Report of the Meeting 
of Experts on Global Co-operation on the Provision of Online Legal Information on National Laws-Annex (The Hague, Oct. 
19-21, 2008), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pdllb2009e.pdf. 
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Court of Justice in Brazil now publishes its decisions online with digital signatures affixed 
to them as an indication of their authenticity. 
: Strategies and Steps 
With more widespread recognition of authentication as a concern with digital government 
information, some action is underway. However, increased efforts are needed to address 
this rapidly growing problem. Initiatives are needed in the education, technology, 
legislative, and advocacy arenas. Particularly at the state or provincial level, opportunities 
for advocacy with legislators, judges, and other government officials should be explored. 
Librarians in all types of libraries should note the needs of their users for authentic 
government information and should share examples of situations where the integrity of 
sources has come into question. In the legal community, such examples might include 
situations in which evidentiary issues have been raised by attorneys and courts concerning 
unofficial, unauthenticated government sources of law in digital format. 
Some recent progress and some ongoing and potential activities are outlined below. 
EDUCATION 
After its groundbreaking State-by-State Report on Authentication of Online Legal 
Resources, the American Association of Law Libraries convened a very successful National 
Summit on Authentication of Digital Legal Information in April 2007. Summit delegates 
included a carefully selected group of law librarians, judges, and representatives from 
the American Bar Association, and state and federal government officials, all of whom 
had expertise or interest in authentication issues. Also participating were technology 
and security experts who were able to speak knowledgeably about the authentication 
technology available in 2007. Since organizing and hosting the Summit, the AALL has 
taken further action, including the following efforts currently underway: 
" Working with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to 
research and draft a uniform act about authentication that could be distributed to 
state legislatures; 
" Establishing state working groups to begin discussing the importance of the 
authentication issue with state legislators and other state government officials; 
" Building alliances with other library associations, national and state, to enlist the 
support of librarians who are familiar with both legal and other types of government-
issued information; 
" Presenting programs about authentication at association conferences, including those 
held by the AALL itself, the Virginia Library Association, and the National Center for 
State Courts' Court Technology Conference; and 
" Publishing articles about the authentication issue and the issues associated with 
non-authenticated digital information in journals directed to judges, lawyers, other 
librarians, technology groups, etc. 
Importantly, AALL members, under the guidance of the Association's Electronic Legal 
Information Access and Citation Committee, in 2009-2010 revisited the previous state-
by-state research and pub 
noting progress or lack tl 
legal materials in digital f 
changes to online legal pu 
making digital informatic 
in favor of online only. T 
states have eliminated th1 
digital format. Eight states 
legal information by takir 
version and time-stampini 
now guarantee permanen 
additional states have ad1 
materials in their states, p 
the 2009-2010 updates is 
websites, pointing out tha 
warranted as official and/ 
almost certainly a direct re 
explanations. 
Other recent efforts to E 
In 2000 the Council on Li 
of the authentication of 
on authenticity and publi 
Digital Environment. In 2 
Authentication White Papi 
Legal E-Access Conference 
legislation in Europe. The 
by European countries to(< 
legislative process; (b) incri 
its legal status; (c) replace l 
(d) provide easy access to 1 
legislation. 19 As mentionec 
convened its meeting of ex 
study on an access to forei. 
the Hague Conference latE 
the experts' responses to ai 
LEGISLATIVE 
The National Conference o 
its work on a uniform ac 
legislatures. A NCCUSL wo1 
19 AkiHietanenandMarikaSeppiu 
(Paris, France, Dec. 11, 2008), availal 
20 Hague Conference on Private 
Responses to the Questionnaire of Octl 
Legal Infonnation on National Laws (T 
pdl lb2009e.pdf. 
st Century 
th digital signatures affixed 
rn with digital government 
forts are needed to address 
ie education, technology, 
vincial level, opportunities 
fficials should be explored. 
f their users for authentic 
ions where the integrity of 
h examples might include 
1eys and courts concerning 
tal format. 
ivities are outlined below. 
tication of Online Legal 
la very successful National 
ril 2007. Summit delegates 
and representatives from 
ient officials, all of whom 
icipating were technology 
about the authentication 
he Summit, the AALL has 
underway: 
on Uniform State Laws to 
at could be distributed to 
: the importance of the 
~overnment officials; 
al and state, to enlist the 
1ther types of government-
nferences, including those 
1d the National Center for 
he issues associated with 
l to judges, lawyers, other 
Kiation's Electronic Legal 
visited the previous state-
Authenticating Digital Government Information 149 
by-state research and published updates to information provided in the 2007 report, 
noting progress or lack thereof for each state in regard to authentication of primary 
legal materials in digital format. These updates indicate that a few states have made 
changes to online legal publications, including adding official and authentic notations, 
making digital information more accessible, and even eliminating print publications 
in favor of online only. The updates show that since the 2007 report, four additional 
states have eliminated the print version of a legal publication in favor of exclusively 
digital format. Eight states have made changes to the availability of their official digital 
legal information by taking steps such as designating the digital version as the official 
version and time-stamping to certify court decisions as authentic. Four additional states 
now guarantee permanent public access to online state legal information, and two 
additional states have adopted a new vendor-neutral citation format for citing legal 
materials in their states, primarily court opinions. Another significant change noted in 
the 2009-2010 updates is that many more states have added disclaimers to their state 
websites, pointing out that the online content is for informational purposes and is not 
warranted as official and/or completely accurate. The addition of these disclaimers is 
almost certainly a direct result of AALL highlighting in its 2007 report the need for such 
explanations. 
Other recent efforts to educate and inform about authentication include the following. 
In 2000 the Council on Library and Information Resources highlighted the importance 
of the authentication of government-issued information by convening a conference 
on authenticity and publishing the proceedings in a report entitled Authenticity in a 
Digital Environment. In 2005 the United States Government Printing Office issued its 
Authentication White Paper in preparation for its work with FDsys. In 2008 the European 
Legal E-Access Conference was held in Paris, France, and one session focused on access to 
legislation in Europe. The speakers identified the many projects from 2004-2008 taken 
by European countries to (a) modernize the production of legislation and the workflow of 
legislative process; (b) increase the reliability of electronic official gazette and to confirm 
its legal status; (c) replace gradually the paper version with authentic electronic version; 
(d) provide easy access to electronic legislation; and (e) produce consolidated electronic 
legislation. 19 As mentioned earlier, the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
convened its meeting of experts in 2008 to address authentication as part of its feasibility 
study on an access to foreign law project. The experts developed guiding principles, and 
the Hague Conference later released three reports as a result of this meeting, including 
the experts' responses to an authentication question.20 
LEGISLATIVE 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) continues 
its work on a uniform act about authentication and preservation to present to state 
legislatures. A NCCUSL working group was established in 2008 and concluded its research 
19 AkiHietanenandMarikaSeppius, LexElectronique, LexAuthentique, Lex Consolidee,EuropeanLegalE-AccessConference 
(Paris, France, Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.legalaccess.eu/IMG/pdf/OO_seppiusparis08seppiushietanen.pdf. 
20 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Accessing the Content of Foreign Law: No. llC-Compilation of 
Responses to the Questionnaire of October 2008 For the Meeting of Experts On Global Co-operation on the Provision of Online 
Legal Infonnation on National Laws (The Hague, Oct. 19-21, 2008), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_ 
pdllb2009e.pdf. 
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in 2009 with a recommendation that NCCUSL form a Drafting Committee to draft a 
uniform law describing minimum standards for the authentication and preservation of 
online state legal materials. The Drafting Committee's prefatory notes to its current draft 
of Authentication and Preservation of State Electronic Legal Materials Act conclude 
... this [act] addresses the critical need to manage electronic legal information in a 
manner that guarantees the trustworthiness of and continuing access to important 
state documents .... A [uniform act] will allow state governments to develop similar 
systems of authentication and preservation, aiding the free flow of information 
across state lines and the sharing of experiences and expertise to keep costs as low 
·· as possible. 
Importantly, section 5 of the draft act states that electronic legal materials, if they are 
authenticated in the manner set forth in the draft act, are presumed "to be a true and 
correct copy of the legal material." 
The Drafting Committee presented its May 2010 draft of the uniform act to the Committee 
of the Whole of the NCCUSL on July 15, 2010. The Committee of the Whole debated the 
draft act, raising several questions and offering numerous comments. The main outcomes 
of the Commissioners' debates were a request for clarification of the relationship between 
the state's official publishers and commercial publishers, a desire by the Commissioners to 
include free access to preserved, historical materials as an option, and a clearer explanation 
regarding the Drafting Committee's intention regarding the effective date of the act. After 
the first reading and debate, the Committee of the Whole accepted the report of the Drafting 
Committee, including the draft uniform act. It also asked the Drafting Committee to meet 
again and consider the comments and questions from the Committee of the Whole. The 
Drafting Committee met in November 2010 to discuss an updated interim draft of the 
uniform act based on the comments of the Committee of the Whole and Drafting Committee 
members. The Drafting Committee reviewed and considered the questions and comments 
raised by the Committee of the Whole in July 2010 and debated additional questions and 
concerns raised by the Drafting Committee members. The Drafting Committee reporter and 
chair will prepare a revised draft uniform act based on the November 2010 meeting, will 
meet again in February 2011, and subsequently will prepare a revised draft uniform act to 
present to the Committee of the Whole again in July 2011. 
The European Legal E-Access Conference session described earlier outlines many 
legislative actions affecting authentication that have occurred in Europe. Notably, France 
established a new kind of chain of custody (confidence) in the production of its Le Journal 
Officiel. Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have established new workflow 
processes and tools for legislative drafting that establish complete chain of custody and 
use different data formats that can be authenticated. Greece has established secure server 
protocol, and the electronic text (PDF) of its gazette carries an integrated electronic 
signature and is, therefore, considered authentic. Austria, Denmark, and Spain publish 
no paper copies of their legal gazettes, and the electronic versions are the only authentic 
versions. Slovenia uses digital signatures with the electronic version of its Uradni list 
Republike Slovenije, which is, therefore, as authentic as the paper version. Hungary has 
implemented authentication of its electronic official gazette. 
Two items would greatly benefit the authentication efforts of many governments: 
standards and best practices manuals. While it may be too early for the development of 
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a comprehensive and widely-accepted set of authentication standards, in their absence 
it would be helpful to governments pursuing authentication if some entity, either 
within or outside government, would compile and publish a "best practices manual." 
Such a manual could provide examples and guidance gleaned from state governments 
and countries that are currently authenticating and preserving their government-issued 
information, providing possible models for others to follow. Currently, no such manual 
exists, although the documents cited in the references and additional readings section 
of this chapter, when reviewed collectively, could certainly assist those who are trying to 
develop such best practices. 
One issue that arises when discussing authentication is whether all government 
information requires the same high level of authentication or whether there are certain 
types of information that merit full authentication, while a lesser standard might be 
adequate and reasonable for other types of information. As discussed previously in this 
chapter, legal information is one category for which the highest level of authentication is 
essential. Other categories for which a high level of assurance is necessary are government 
research data, budgetary information, and statistics. The integrity and chain of custody 
for these categories of information must be assured. If necessary, a lesser standard of 
assurance might be justified for information of a less-sensitive nature or information, 
which is frequently updated or replaced. Another question is: what would the different 
levels of authentication be? Are some types of digital government information ephemeral, 
requiring no intentional authentication? If authentication is possible for some, but not 
all, categories of government information, how should government publishers prioritize 
the provision of authentication? Much more discussion needs to occur on these matters. 
TECHNOLOGY 
Technology to authenticate digital government information is currently available. For 
purposes of electronic commerce, governments in many countries have implemented 
systems using digital signatures. However, in most instances those same governments 
have been slow to employ similar technological or other means to ensure that the legal 
and other information they produce in digital format is authenticated and reliable. These 
governments have been particularly concerned about the potential costs associated 
with implementing and maintaining authentication systems. An additional concern 
to governments is how quickly various types of technology become obsolete. For 
example, some technologists by late 2010 were regarding Message-Digest algorithm 5 
(MDS), mentioned earlier in the chapter and used by Utah to confirm the integrity of 
its administrative code and other administrative publications, as an obsolete technology 
that no longer provides sufficient assurances. 
At least one technological initiative is necessary-governments need to adopt 
relevant existing standards and assist in the development of additional standards for 
authentication. One aspect of this initiative is a determination by governments regarding 
how much standardization is necessary. Efforts among member states in the European 
Union are leading the technology initiative. Those member states have taken significant 
steps through the European Legal E-Access Conference to address standards. Also, the 
experts at the Hague Conference on Private International Law 11 Accessing the Content 
of Foreign Law" meeting identified the following as one of their guiding principles: 
"State parties are encouraged to cooperate in the development of common standards 
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for metadata applicable to legal materials, particularly those intended to enable and 
encourage interchange. 11 In fact, one of the experts at the Hague Conference commented, 
"I also hope that the Hague Conference can become a stakeholder in helping to create a 
standard for the authentication of official digital law."21 
Furthermore, article 8 of the NCCUSL draft uniform act addresses the question 
of standards: "In implementing the requirements of this act, the official publisher 
shall consider: (1) standards and practices of other jurisdictions; (2) any standards on 
authentication and preservation of records adopted by national standard-setting bodies; 
and (3) the needs of electronic records users." In the comments after this article, the 
NCCUSL stresses the importance of efficiency in order to encourage states within the 
United States to communicate and coordinate the development of authentication, 
preservation, and permanent access standards. The NCCUSL also suggests that national 
organizations consider the promulgation of best practices statements and standards and 
share their work. NCCUSL concludes its comments with this statement: "International 
organizations may also be tackling this issue and, to the extent that their work is relevant 
to the US states, it could also be considered. 1122 
For such sharing to be effective, governments in all countries should do more than 
simply consider what other governments are doing. They should work together to establish 
national and international best practices and standards and then adopt procedures and 
processes to implement those practices and standards. Certainly, governments should 
consider the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) XML authentication standards and the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 5652 digital signature standards. As some people 
have pointed out, any government that is adopting XML for its government information 
is effectively creating a standard as well. 
ADVOCACY 
Cooperative efforts by librarians and their professional organizations are needed to 
convince governments of the importance of authenticating and preserving their digital 
information and to provide examples of cost-effective means to do so. Lobbying efforts 
with government legislative bodies are crucial. To accomplish this goal, librarians and 
library organizations must build alliances with other groups and must extend the scope of 
their alliances to include groups with whom librarians may not have worked previously. 
For example, in the United States, the American Association of Law Libraries, recognizing 
the importance of working with groups such as the Council of State Governments, the 
American Bar Association, the National Association of Secretaries of State, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, state archivists, and groups of 
judges, has been developing those relationships. The AALL also has created state working 
groups to ensure access to digital legal information by taking three actions: (1) oppose 
any plan to eliminate state official print legal resources unless the digital version is 
authenticated and preserved permanently; (2) ensure that a disclaimer is added to any 
legal resources on state websites, indicating that the information is not official or authentic 
if the state has not taken actions to make the information official and authentic; and (3) 
21 Id. at 59. 
22 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform Law Commission), Prefat01y Note, 
Authentication and Preservation of State Electronic Legal Materials Act (2010). 
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participate in the development of a national inventory of all primary legal resources at 
every level of government. 
Leaders in other disciplines such as science and medicine need to be engaged in 
discussions on the importance of authentication of government data and statistics on 
which their work depends. Members of the public must be made aware of the difference 
between government information that appears on a commercial website and the 
authenticated version of that same information found on a government website - that 
they can rely on the latter but not the former. Librarians and library organizations must 
develop marketing and promotional materials that indicate clearly why authentication 
of government-issued information is such an important issue and how it affects the daily 
lives of citizens, as well as lawyers, judges, researchers, scholars, and government officials. 
Keeping attention focused on authentication must be a collaborative effort; an 
alliance of advocates is more likely to be effective than groups working individually. It 
would certainly be beneficial for additional stakeholders to be engaged in advocacy on 
authentication. For example, the library and information community, governments, and 
others interested in authenticating digital government information in various countries 
might benefit by partnering with the "free access to law" movement. "Free access to law" is 
the umbrella designation for a collection of legal information institutes (Llls) throughout 
common law countries that have been organized to provide free and open online access 
to legal information, such as case law, statutes, and regulations. Many legal information 
institutes throughout the world, including the World Legal Information Institute, the 
Australasian Legal Information Institute, the British and Irish Legal Information Institute, 
the Canadian Legal Information Institute, and the Southern African Legal Information 
Institute, are part of this "free access to law" movement. 
In October 2002, the LIIs met in Montreal at the Fourth Law via Internet Conference 
and issued a joint statement of their philosophy of access to the law, including the 
following three points: 
Public legal information from all countries and international institutions is part of 
the common heritage of humanity. Maximizing access to this information promotes 
justice and the rule of law; 
" Public legal information is digital common property and should be accessible to all 
on a non-profit basis and free of charge; 
" Independent non-profit organizations have the right to publish public legal 
information and the government bodies that create or control that information 
should provide access to it as that it can be published. 
Providing access to digital information is a significant goal of the LIIs. An equally significant 
goal should be ensuring that the information used by citizens is authentic, reliable, and 
trustworthy. It seems reasonable that the "free access to law" movement has a major 
stake in the authentication of digital government information and could be a cooperative 
partner for librarians and others in efforts to ensure that the information accessible 
through LIIs is reliable and trustworthy. At a recent workshop at Princeton University 
about open government and transparency, a participant, who also is a leader in the "free 
access to law" movement, made the connection between the free access movement and the 
authentication issue in his remarks. When discussing his Law.gov project, he emphasized 
the importance of lobbying the US federal government for the authentication of digital 
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legal information by requiring 11 ••• each law-making federal entity to authenticate all 
digital legal information it produces."23 Many others from the Llls would likely join him 
in collaborating with librarians and others in lobbying efforts with government legislative 
bodies to emphasize the importance of the authentication issue. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Digital authentication of government-issued information is not yet a widespread practice, 
although procedures to do so are becoming more common, especially in Europe. Until 
a government can ensure that a digital document it issues is exactly what the document 
purports to be, reliance on that digital version carries an inherent risk. This is a particular 
concern with certain types of information, such as primary sources of the law-court 
opinions, legislative enactments and administrative regulations-but also for statistical 
and research data of interest to those in other disciplines. 
In 2006 a law partner with a large United States law firm described the digitization 
of information as a "societal sea change." Using legal materials, information records, 
photographs, and other types of evidence that an attorney might want to introduce 
into court proceedings as examples, he expressed concern about the lack of authenticity 
of digital materials and images. He concluded: "Now, more purely stored and easily 
manipulated information is pervasive in our society's informational records. All these 
records-used to document communications, transactions and the appearance of 
reality-must be capable of 'authenticity testing.' Otherwise, tribunals will be unable to 
provide their most basic functions." 24 Courts, he continued, must face the fact that the 
old authenticity paradigms, such as seals and the printed format, are disappearing, and 
judges and court administrators must encourage legislators and others to come up with 
solutions for authentication, which might possibly turn out to be superior to the old 
paradigms. 
The Association of Reporters of Judicial Decisions (ARJD) came to a similar conclusion 
in 2007 in its Statement of Principles: "Official" On-Line Documents (revised in 2008): 
[ a]n on-line government document, even one designated 11 official," cannot be considered 
authoritative if it does not satisfy ... authentication criterion .... As long as only the print 
version of an official document meets the foregoing authentication and permanence 
criteria, the print version ... should control and be considered authoritative ... 
AALL's State-By-State Report on Authentication Of Online Legal Resources, published in 
2007, raised the same concerns about state-level primary legal resources on the Web and 
concluded that unless proper authentication procedures are in place, such government-
hosted legal information in digital format is not sufficiently trustworthy. 
All levels of government within the United States and governments in other 
countries must now face this reality: familiar types of authentication that everyone trusts ~ 
23 Open Government: Defining, Designing, and Sustaining Transparency: a Two-Day Workshop at Princeton University 
(Princeton, NJ: Center for Information Technology Policy, Jan. 21-22, 2010), available at http://citp.princeton.edu/open-
government-workshop/. 
24 George L. Paul, The "Authenticity Crisis" In Real Evidence, Law Practice Today, March 2006, available at http://apps. 
americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/tch03065.shtml. 
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are disappearing quickly as governments switch to making their information available 
exclusively in digital format. Without the necessary authentication, citizens cannot 
trust government-issued information and can never be sure that the information is 
what it purports to be. Governments have an obligation to authenticate the information 
they issue by adopting appropriate practices, standards, and technology to ensure its 
trustworthiness and reliability. 
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